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INTEGRATIVE SEMANTICS 
My purpose here is to sketch a theory of integrative semantics 
developed by J.-P. Paillet and myself over the past few years, and to 
show how it works. Then I shall summarize its characteristics and 
propose some conditions on an adequate semantic theory. Lastly, I want 
to make explicit some differences between this theory and a class of 
other theories. 
A complete theory of language provides that the description of 
a language will include a general mapping which connects each arrang-
ement of formatives which is possible in the language to specified 
aspects of the reality(s) or real situation(s) to which it may be 
applied truly, falsely, appropriately, or not at all. For a number 
of reasons, there must be an intermediate level, a semantic represent-
ation, which is related to both the formative string and the universe 
of interpretation, or "reality(s)" above. This representation is pre-
sumably free of the syntactic and morphological irregularities present 
in a formative string (it is content and not expression in Hjelmslev1s 
terms), nor does it contain particular objects or "facts" of the univ-
erse of interpretation (again with Hjelmslev, it is form of content and 
not substance of content). Of the information transmitted by a signal 
(expression), it represents all and only the information underlying 
variation which does not obligatorily express information about the 
source and/or destination (see my "Convergent Routes to Meaning", for 
1972 meeting of C.L.A.). 
Due to our interest in natural language, we are not very interest-
ed in the mapping between the semantic or content representation (CR) 
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and the universe of interpretation : our interest in this interpretation 
is confined to whether or not the elements of the CR and the relations in 
the CR itself can indeed be interpreted in terms of a universe of inter-
pretation. 
On the other hand, the mapping between the formative string and the 
CR is mediated in part by linguistic transformations as defined in Chomsky 
or as in Harris. Because we find evidence that a CR is not generally 
expressible as trees, there will have to be parts of this mapping which 
cannot be stated in linguistic transformations. We would like to know, 
however, how much of that mapping can be stated in those terms, and how 
much should be. To attack that question, we must first discover as much 
as possible about the nature of an adequate CR. 
If we assume that the grammar (the mapping between the formative 
string and the CR) is consistent and not exceedingly complex, and that 
the interpretation (the mapping between the CR and the universe of inter-
pretation) is likewise consistent and simple, we can show that some theo-
ries about the nature of the CR are not adequate. 
We call "integrative" a theory of semantic representation which pro-
vides for the integration of the meanings of several sentences into a 
single unitary meaning. On a most fundamental level, the necessity for 
integrativity results from an assumption about semantic representation; 
if the meaning of a discourse of sentences S- followed by S9 is the same 
as the meaning of an other discourse S«, then the CR of S- followed by 
S9 must be formally identical to the CR of S . This condition disallows 
the CR of successive sentences from being a simple conjunction of the 
CR1S of the individual sentences; rearrangement of the sentences in a para-
graph may alter its meaning, or more likely, may destroy it completely. 
Because CR(S1 + S2) t CR(S2 + S 1), then CR(S1 + S7) * CR(S1) & CR(S2). 
It is also clear that if CR(S-) is a single unitary graph (or tree), 
then CR(S, + S 9 ) must also be. But S.. + S9 generally includes some 
redundancy if it paraphrases S-, which means that CR(S1) overlaps CR(S9) 
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if together they are identical to CR(SO. This shows informally why 
CR1S cannot simply be combined by a logical connective. Obvious ar-
guments using paraphrastic discourse show further that the CR cannot 
indicate anything about the lexical items, the parts of speech, or even 
the sentence boundaries, of the expression. 
But my purpose here is to exemplify, rather than provide rationale 
for, an integrative semantic theory. Arguments and rationale may be 
found in the various papers by Paillet and myself. For an example to 
demonstrate integration, let us take a sentence more familiarly known 
as Bach's paradox. 
In dependency grammar, the sentence a boy wanted a prize is repre-
sented as; 
Want 
Boy Prize 
which may be stated in linear form : Want (Boy., Prize), We will use this 
same graphic (and easily linearized) notation, rotated so that domination 
is down and to the right. 
Want-
The direction downward represents the first actant, rightward the last 
actant, with other actants (if any) in order between. For a content 
representation, it is necessary to make a fundamental modification to 
dependency representation, based on the question : What is it that wants ?> 
in the above sentence. Obviously, it is not boy, but something which is 
a boy. Our example sentence is paraphrased by something which is a boy 
wants a prize, hence must have the same CR. The relations between boy 
and something, and between wants a prize and something are both predica-
tions about this thing : their representations must be alike. Thus we 
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will graph as follows : 
Want  
Boy 1 
or linearly : Want Cx3 y) & Boy(x) . The same applies in-toto for prize, 
as in the graph below. We must also treat the past tense marker -ed> 
the semantic component of which we will call Past . What is past is the 
relationship named Want (x^ y), hence Past will dominate that relationship; 
Prize 
Pas t Want 1 
Boy ! 
or : Boy(x) & Prize(y) & Past (Want(x, y)). 
This representation, which we call a C-net, contains unanalysed 
words. As mentioned above, an adequate CR does not contain words, thus 
we are not finished. For this example, it will suffice for the moment 
to analyse boy. Both componential analysis and Carnap's meaning postu-
lates yield three elements in the meaning of boy—to call something a 
boy is to purport that he is human, male and young—Boy(x) = = = > Eumanix) 
& Male(x) & Young(x). Thus, we arrive at a temporary analysis of the 
sentence (I shall omit the linearized forms from now on as they are too 
cumbersome); 
Prize 
Pas t Want 1 
Young ^ ^^ 
Male ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Human — ~"^**> ! 
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or, in the past, a thing which was young, male and human wanted something 
which was a prize. This is the complete C-net for the sentence as there 
are no sentences for it to be integrated into. 
If a second sentence is encountered, he deserved the prize, it will 
be mapped by the simple and consistent grammar we assumed, into the fol-
lowing , 
Prize 
Past 1 Deserve >* 
Male .* 
where the asterisk (*) represents the définiteness of the nominal in the 
second sentence. Such asterisks indicate that the sentence from which they 
originate cannot stand alone, and they must be removed by integration into 
a C-net. This pre-integration graph, the only type which can contain 
asterisks, is called a D-net; it is roughly analogous to the deep structure 
of a sentence in a transformational grammar, except that it resembles more 
closely a dependency structure. 
The process of integration creates a new C-net from the C-net result-
ing from the previous sentence(s) by adding the portions of the C-net 
which are not already there. This can involve some choice as to which of 
two maximal integrations is intended, which accounts for much of the 
misunderstanding in ordinary discourse . In this case, there is no choice. 
1. There are two interesting aspects that have not been explored here. 
First, the parts of the D-net which are not matched are the "new 
information" provided by that sentence (with certain exclusions, like 
performative markers, if they are present In D-nets). This promises 
to yield a formalization of what and maybe how much cognitive information 
is provided by a sentence in a given context. We may expect also that 
these unmatched parts of D will be the 'focus1 of the sentence when 
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Integration proceeds by adding the unmatched elements of the D-net to 
the C-net. The resulting C-net is, (I shall ignore the Past markers 
here forward ); 
Deserve Prize 
Human 
Male 
Young-
By the simple and consistent.grammar, the sequence of these two sentences, 
resulting in this C-net, should have as paraphrases a boy wanted the prize 
he deserved and the boy who deserved it wanted a prize etc. 
A third sentence, the boy got the prize > will have a D-net similar 
to that of the second sentence. If integrated into the previous C-net, 
the result will be ; 
2. 
focus is marked. If so, a marked focus will reduce the possibilities 
of integration. It may also allow an algorithm to extract the focus 
in a language which doesn't mark focus (e.g. written English) for 
translation to a language which does mark focus (e.g. French). 
Second, the predicates which dominate an asterisk, and are not under 
the action of a performative, are conditions on integration. If 
integration is to be successful, they must be found in the old 
C-net. These comprise a major class of presuppositions; this leads 
to the suspicion that all true presuppositions are of the following 
nature : conditions on a C-net which must be satisfied if a sentence 
is to be integrated into it. 
It seems probably that tense markers are elements of a different 
orders — as are all the "shifters" of R. Jakobson. These and 
other deictic elements may not belong to C-nets at all. 
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This C-net also stands for the content of the boy who wanted it got the 
-prize he deserved. 
This sentence was known as Bach's paradox, for the following obser-
vation : if pronominalization is the replacement of the whole noun phrase 
by a pronoun (as was supposed), then this sentence would have an infinite 
deep structure. It motivated the device of referential indices, which 
allow the problem — what is an adequate CR — to be sidestepped, but which 
3 
don't really solve it . 
This example also shows that if a syntax (rules of arrangement) iden-
tifies clause boundaries, it is fairly easy to construct a grammar which 
maps one clause at a time into an integratable D-net. It thus appears 
that there is no need in a general linguistic theory for a "deep struc-
ture", or its integrative analogue a D-net, for a whole sentence. More-
over, to have such a level of representation necessitates otherwise unnec-
essary complexity and attributes to natural language a possibility it 
doesn't have. That is, the D-nets of clauses can be integrated directly, 
without passing through a D-net for the whole sentence. The other case 
is possible : a D-net for the sentence could be created (by integrating 
the D-nets for its clauses), which would then be integrated into the C-net 
3. Indices are identical if and only if reference is made to the same 
object. Indexing of objects is not intended, and can have no justi-
fication. Indices are a formal, but much too powerful device to tie 
the branches (or twigs) of a deep structure tree together. Thus tied, 
the deep structure is no longer a tree, but a graph. 
Referential indices are a patch for a theory of deep structure, and 
they necessitate another patch to make non-distinct those deep struc-
tures which differ only in the arrangement of the indices, e.g. he- saw 
him^ vs. he « saw him^ . 
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of previous sentences. A language which utilized the possibilities of 
reference allowed in that case is in principle possible, but is differ-
ent from natural language; the identifications made in the process of 
integration (identifications of referents and of concepts) would be made 
so far as possible within the sentence. This seems not to be the case 
for natural language; in the following discourse he does not refer to 
Bill unambiguously : John came to visit. The fact that he was disliked 
by the nurse didnft bother Bill inthe slightest. 
We have given an example of the integration of sentential meaning 
into discourse meaning. It should be noted that the replacement of the 
predicate Boy by the three atomic predicates Human, Young and Male can 
be considered simply as the lexical item boy w coveringfl these three pre-
dicates. This is formalized as conversion rules (analogous to meaning 
postulates) in my "Interpretation and integration...^". This paper 
gives other examples, and proposes a formal model that deals with pro-
blems of integration. 
Let us return to this example, as there is more to be milked from 
it. Based on various sorts of evidence (McCawley (1970) and Bierwisch 
(1970)), it is clear that get with a nominal object can be analysed as 
an inchoative element 8 and a predicate Have (the predicate underlying 
have NP); it can be paraphrased as come to have. It is easily seen 
that he gets a prize has a C-net; 
Prize 
|3 — Have 1 
Male ! 
4. T. R. Hofmann, 1972, "Interpretation and ,Integration of Sentences 
into a C-ret", dans R. Kittredge (éd.), Etudes en linguistique 
appliquée à la traduction automatique3 TAUM, Montréal, Université 
de Montréal. 
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In much the same way, want is analysable as desire to have, and deserve 
as should have* If the pseudo-predicates Get> Want and Deserve are 
replaced by these analyses, we might expect that then three distinct 
occurrences of the relationship Have would appear in the C-net. What 
is asserted by the sentence is however, that of the relationship of 
a boy having a prize, it was desired, it should have been, and it came 
to be. The integration of the maximal amount of elements insures this 
result : the predicate Have in the D-nets of successive sentences (or 
clauses) matches the Have in the C-net already present, hence integratior 
does not allow its repetition. The resultant C-net is really : 
Desire 
Young. 
Male. 
Human 
Should Prize 
-Have-
The portions of the C-net covered by the lexical items get, want and 
deserve overlap. 
get deserve 
want 
Should \ 
HaveV^-
Human 
\ ; 
Prize 
This redundancy is not unusual but cannot be adequately represented 
without a graph representation. Such overlapping also accounts for 
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selectional restriction, as I shall show later. It also accounts for 
at least part of the restrictions between governing and subordinate 
verbs. 
One type of overlapping is worthy of special mention, as it has 
occasionally been the source of much argument among linguists. Irreg-
ular expressions of tense, comparatives and so on have a natural repre-
sentation in C-nets. Simple arguments assure us that got is the expres-
sion for Past (Get (x> y)). If Get (x3 y) is analysed as ^(Have (x3 y)), 
then Got (x> y) is replaced by Past (B(HaVe (x3 y)))9 parallel to the 
replacement of Boy (x) by Human (x) & Young (x) & Male (x). 
get : 8 Have  
qot : Past 3 Have  
I 
Got is simply a word like any other — an association between an acoustic 
image and a concept (incomplete C-net). It is a hyponym of get just as 
boy is a hyponym of person. It is different from most hyponymic terms 
in that the additional atom that distinguishes its concept from that of 
get, a predicate Past, is obligatorily expressed in English, unlike the 
additional atom for boy, Young. The use of got instead of get is accor-
dingly obligatory if Past is appropriate. 
With these examples to bring substance to the following discussion, 
let us note some characteristics of the C-net theory of integrative se-
mantic representation. 
1) The basic assumption is that identical representations must be 
afforded to paraphrastic expressions. This means that the same repre-
sentation must be assigned to the same meaning regardless of the syn-
tactic structures (or lexical items) used. 
2) Deriving from this, a C-net (or any adequate semantic represen-
tation) cannot contain syntactic or lexical information. No markers of 
the form of expression, syntactic or lexical, may appear. 
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3) Based on an assumption of simplicity, and indeed, to model our 
comprehension of a discourse, there are no repeated mentions of objects 
of the universe of interpretation. The points, which stand in a one to 
one correspondance with objects in the universe of interpretation, are 
not repeated as are the variables in the linear notation of the predi-
cate calculus or the referential indices of transformational grammar. 
4) Multiple domination of a point (or a predicate, for that matter) 
corresponds to the logician's conjunction (there are several other types 
of conjunction in natural language). The logician needs two devices to 
linearize the C-net; a conjunction operator and variables (names for 
points). 
5) It is observable that natural language never has names for indi-
vidual points, only descriptors which may be more or less specific. 
Names which designate unique individuals are a philosopher's fiction which 
falls apart if pressed very hard. 
6) Meaning of words are observed to be connected sub-networks which 
are in general incomplete. Except for predicates designating conditions 
(e.g. Rain), words have one or more unfilled actants . Word meaning, 
altough it is contained in discourse meaning, is of a fundamentally 
different nature, as discourse meaning (a C-net) contains no unfilled 
actants. 
5. One might ask the question whether all lexical words can be defined 
in terms of atomic predicates. The answer is now fairly clear as 
yes, but significant portions of the meanings of many (especially 
infrequent) words are only hinted at by their analyses. It seems 
that every word has two types of meaning; a conceptual meaning which 
we have discussed here, & an experiencial meaning which is some sort 
of generalization over the contexts it has been found in (by the 
individual who has that meaning). The conceptual meaning includes 
the term's position in a folk taxonomy (e.g. pintoî type of pony), 
hence there is always at least one predicate present in the conceptual 
meaning. The conceptual meaning controls the generalization across 
contexts of experiencial meaning, and is the only aspect of meaning a 
speaker is held socially accountable for. 
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A complete description of a language includes a mapping from forma-
tive strings (sequences of words) to assertions and questions about a 
universe of discourse. For such a description to be adequate, we claim 
that it must include a level of representation which has the above pro-
perties. It is possible to investigate this level of representation di-
rectly, as I have shown above. And it is necessary to investigate this 
level if one wants to compare various syntactic theories (e.g. transfor-
mational syntax in either its interpretative or generative semantic va-
rieties, tagmemic or other) for adequacy as a theory of grammar. 
In addition, an adequate representation must handle selectional res-
trictions, but not as constraints of combinability. I will return to this 
shortly to show how this variety of integrative semantics handles them. 
We expect it furthermore to make explicit what the presuppositions of 
a discourse are, and to express the meaning in terms of entailed propo-
sitions (see note 1). 
Over and above these requirements, we assume several further condi-
tions in order to study content representations without assuming specific 
theories of grammar and interpretation — in order to study semantics 
autonomously. First, we must assume that there is a grammar and an inter-
pretation, and that they are both consistent and not complex. We suppose, 
and have not yet been contradicted, that for any meaning there is one 
unique representation corresponding to it — there are not two CR's for 
the same meaning. This assumption is really of the nature of a condition 
on what we would (like to) accept as a representation of meaning. The 
reason that I keep like to is that it is conceivable that this condition 
cannot be preserved; it may even be provably unpreservable. So far, our 
variety of integrative semantics has been able to preserve it, while both 
linear types of representation (e.g. the predicate calculus and generative 
semantics) fail miserably. 
A condition of analysability, that analyses involving a predicate 
are independent of the analysis of the predicate itself, is rather im-
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portant for autonymous investigation into semantics, for without it, 
all analyses may be destroyed at a later date by investigation into 
their bases. If it holds, one need not worry about later investiga-
tion, as it will not affect present analyses. Fortunately it can be 
relaxed to some degree without ill effect, and a better formulation of 
this condition would be useful. 
An other rule of thumb, that the meaning of a word is a locally-
connected subgraph of the C-net to which it contributes, holds true so 
far as we know for lexical items, but shows signs of cracking for the 
case of quantifiers. This condition of local connectivity is apparently 
entailed by the condition of analysability and they may both fail for 
quantifiers. 
Returning to our example we may illustrate how selectional restric-
tions can be handled. An adequate theory of language cannot treat them 
as restrictions or conditions on using a given collocation because they 
are too easily broken, as for example in a children's story (a universe 
of interpretation which is fictitious) the old rooking chair was tired 
and wanted a rest or in metaphor we propose that a selectional restriction 
is nothing more than a part of the meaning (concept) of the word. 
Assuming that want, with its usual meaning, requires of its subject 
that it refer to an animal object, we may revise the analysis assigned to 
it. Instead of the following-, 
Desire Have y 
^ x 
we propose that its subject (x) be animate : 
Desire —Have y 
Animate ^ ^ v 
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In the above analyses, the addition of Animate will cause no contradic-
tion, but a sentence this rook wants a purpose will have a C-net 
Purpose 
Desire- Have-
This contains a contradiction on the lower point; there is something 
which is both a rock and is animate. This particular contradiction can 
be solved in two ways. The general way is to treat it metaphorically, 
as personifying or animating the rock, and the specific way is to find 
an unusual meaning for want (or rook), here lack or not have as in this 
rook lacks a purpose. 
To account for this latter possibility, we propose that the absence 
of contradictions is another condition for integration. With the other 
conditions on integration, the possible interpretations given to a sen-
tence (its possible integrations) in context is usually quite small. 
One of the biggest problems for computer comprehension (or translation) 
of human language is the multitudes of ambiguities met in ordinary lan-
guage. The theory of language must account for the fact that although 
these ambiguities exist for the sentence in isolation, they do not hinder 
interpretation. Integrative semantics is a first attempt to account for 
these blatant problems. 
I would like to note that these problems are far from exhausting 
semantics. First, besides the conceptual meaning of a word which we 
have discussed, there is an experiencial meaning derived from one's 
experiences with the word. This part is not social, hence not inves-
tigatable by linguistic modes of inquiry. I presume that affect is 
included here. There are also performative aspects of sentences, and 
"universe-creating" verbs (e.g. say), which Paillet in particular has 
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suggested relating to the "shifters" of Jakobson (see note 2). Our 
present view is that these connect whole C-nets rather than points or 
predicates. 
An other thing which we have not touched is the process of making 
reference. One may also study the dictionary as a system of concepts* 
I would recommend Lamb (1970) for the philosophy of how this interacts 
with human life and some idea of its scope,and Bierwich (1970) for a 
well-developed account of some of what this entails. Related to this, 
McCawley has approached questions of "what is a possible lexical item 
[conceptual meaning] ?" 
An other very interesting area which needs exploration is how the 
presence of certain predicates about a point negates other predicates 
(presumably in integration). For instance, the predicates of tall boy 
are the simple sum of the predicates of tall and boy > but not so for 
girl bachelor where the Male of bachelor is somehow supressed. Further-
more, there are cases of atomic predicates which have two actants and 
a given interpretation. If only one of these actants is filled, the 
interpretation (in English at least) seems to be slightly different. 
One case of this is the predicate paraphrased as is a child of, which 
I will argue to be is young if the second actant is not filled. 
C-networks can be expressed in a parenthesis notation resembling 
that of the predicate calculus. This notational equivalence is useful 
for rendering this semantic representation completely formal and famil-
iar, but tends to suggest that C-networks are a notational variant of 
predicate calculus. They are actually two hypotheses which differ in a 
number of ways. I would like to make these differences explicit, as the 
predicate calculus has found considerable acceptance in linguistic works 
of recent years (see Fodor (1970) or Bellert (1972)). I hope to make it 
apparent that they are not equivalent in any sense and will indicate areas 
in which evidence may be sought to eliminate one or the other hypothesis. 
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It is perhaps appropriate first to sketch the algorithm for conver-
ting diagrammatic C-networks into the linear C-networks which resemble 
the predicate calculus notation : 
1) First, a variable (x, y, z, etc.) is assigned to each point. 
2) Then for each predicate (P.) dominating a point (V.), the line 
of domination is erased between P. and V., and P. is replaced by P^(V.). 
Predicates P. which dominate two or more points V., V. , , in counter-
J 1 i""-L> ... 
clockwise direction beginning from downward, are replaced by P^(V.»vi+i ) 
with all of the lines of domination erased. 
3) Points from which all domination lines have been removed are 
erased. 
4) Operations 2) and 3) are repeated until they can no longer apply, 
with the term point understood as "Predicate with its arguments under it" 
(i.e. one which no longer dominates anything graphically). Where there is 
multiple domination of a predicate, it is necessary to give it (and all 
it dominates) a name (p, q, r, etc.) — equivalent to returning to the 
first rather than the second step of the algorithm. When this procedure 
reaches the maximal elements of the network, the resulting formulae are 
not erased because no line dominating them was erased (as they didn't 
have any dominating elements). 
5) The last step is to conjoin all these formulae. 
This algorithm is readily reversible, thus the two notations are 
weakly equivalent. There are obvious differences for a metric of simpli-
city, but equivalent metrics can be defined, by virtue of the equivalence 
of notations. The graphic notation seems more natural, because, like 
natural language, it does not utilize, nor allow, the naming of indivi-
duals (points). The introduction of variables to name individuals and 
predication in the linear notation is needed only to express information 
concerning coreference, and serves as a device to express a non-linear 
network as a formal, linear notation . A simplicity metric for the linear 
6. This linear notation is essentially identical with that used on the 
Université de Montréal computer (in LISP). 
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expression of a C-network will accordingly be complex, as it must essen-
tially reconstruct the graphic formulation and operate on it. The con-
cern here with simplicity is not for the purpose of formalizing an expli-
cit simplicity metric. We are presently concerned with simplicity only 
on the informal and intuitive level, where a science assumes the (intui-
tively) most simple explanation for a phenomenon, until proven wrong. It 
is simplicity as measured on the graphic representation that is assumed 
important to the discovery of an adequate semantic representation of na-
tural language. 
Turning now to the differences between the predicate calculus (PC) 
notation and the C-notation, it is first noticed that PC notation is not 
integrative. I have explained elsewhere why an adequate semantic theory 
of natural language must be integrative. PC could be used integratively, 
but as it is commonly understood, used and defined, it is not so. This 
means that there are generally equivalent forms which are formally dis-
tinct, and this entails the presence of rules of derivation, to convert 
each form into its equivalent forms. This characteristic is present also 
in the linear C-notation, but the equivalent C-forms differ only in pre-
dications (the p, q, r, etc., above). The use of predicate names can be 
removed at the expense of some redundancy, and the only rule of deri-
vation is the commutativity of the logical &. 
An illustration of the non-integrative nature of PC-notation is a 
conjoined formula over variables x, y, z, where the jfc" formula is an 
equation fx = yf. In an integrative PC, this formula would demand that 
all y's in previous formulae (F1 to F ^ ) are replaced by xfs, and it 
7. This is not so for circular assertions, such as following. If such 
are possible, the use of referential indices for predicates is neces-
sitated in linear and tree representations of content. 
she asserts that I deny her assertion 
a = Assert (she, b) & b = Deny (I, a) 
this sentence is false a = False (a) 
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would stand on the side, to cause later formulae (F. + n + 1) to undergo 
this same replacement. The existence of such equations in PC-formulae, 
with xfs and y!s in formulae on both sides, is a result of PC not being 
integrative. Incidentally, the naturalness of the graphic notation is 
readily apparent here. If a sentence decodes into such an equation, each 
conjoined formula in the linear C-notation will be subjected to the above 
replacement. In the graphic notation, the two points need only be brought 
together and superimposed; the equation causes a change in the structure 
of the C-network and then itself disappears. 
Substantial differences between PC an C hypotheses include the follow-
ing : 1) C-notation, like natural language, has no names for points. PC 
has both individual names and variable names; 2) PC has functors & and v. 
McCawley has shown that v, the inclusive or of PC, does not match the En-
glish or, or the Latin out or vel. Many occurrences of and are not repre-
sentable by the logical &. I am inclined to think that neither the logi-
cal & nor its dual v is needed for the representation of natural language; 
3) PC does not represent the differences between the quantification in the 
following sentences. C-notation, if adequate, must; 
(1) elephants are found in Africa and Asia 
(2) the elephant is found in Africa and Asia 
(3) *an elephant is found in Africa and Asia 
(4) all elephants are found in Africa and Asia 
(5) ?every elephant is found in Africa and Asia 
(6) each elephant is found in Africa and Asia 
(7) any elephant is found in Africa and Asia 
4) C-notation includes two-place predicates in which either place may be 
absent, where the meanings of the resulting one-place predicates are a 
function of the two-place predicates. PC-notation does not allow this 
directly and an equivalent well-formed PC-notation contains some distor-
tion and additional rules of derivation; 5) PC has no limit on the number 
of variables a predicate may relate; C-predicates can be limited to two 
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places, not as a mathematical convention, but as a condition of naturalness 
and simplicity in the analysis of natural human languages. 
Quantifiers were not mentioned above with regard to the linear C-
notation. This is because 6) there seems to be only one such; it asserts 
existence in C. Of course, a C-network may contain an atomic quasi-
O 
predicate (following a suggestion of Paillet ) which expresses what a 
PC quantifier does; such would assert existence etc., in the universe 
of interpretation (not in C) ; 7) the iota and lambda operators of PC 
are similar to, but different from definite or anaphoric L. This opera-
tor asserts that the listener can identify a unique referent with the 
information accompanying it. This information need not include its essen-
tial properties; identification may be made based solely on accidental 
characteristics. L is intimately related to the concept of integration; 
the closest PC can come to expressing it would be a definition of the 
sort (for a definite nominal f in the ittl sentence S.) : 
L1X (f(x)) : = = x (f(x) & [3 j, l<j<i-l & S. = >f(w)] =>(w=x)) 
This definition of the L operator ignores the properties of L with regard 
to the universe of interpretation. In this aspect, the interpretation 
of L is dependant on the state of the universe at the time of usage : 
it is thus impossible to represent in a non-integrative PC. Further, 
L does not assert more than 'local uniqueness1 in the interpretation 
universe, e.g. hand me the (L) red pencil does not presuppose that there 
is only one red pencil in the universe. Iota, on the other hand, asserts 
uniqueness for the entire universe of interpretation. 
It is obvious that PC-notation can be extended — to include addi-
tional quantifiers, different functors, an L operator, and even syste-
matically ambiguous predicates. The form of the notation is weakly equi-
valent, and it could be used in an integrative way. But with these 
8. See p. 1-18, J.-P. Paillet article. 
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extensions, or just half of them, it would seem to be seriously different 
from what one understands by predicate calculus. PC is therefore not a 
notational variant of C-network. And, if all these extensions were accep-
ted to make an extended PC, it would be no more than weakly equivalent 
to a C-network. 
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